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Abstract 
 
In post-conflict countries were instability has intensified, it becomes apparent 
how inadequate development assistance can be and why even after large sum of 
investments development assistance has not been able to completely alleviate poverty. 
For agencies like the World Bank that provide first hand assistance, we question whether 
there are prerequisites needed in order for their policies to be effective and whether these 
policies are targeting the core reasons for the countries’ poverty dilemma.  
African countries continue to hold intricate predicaments that may at times be too 
complicated to be analyzed without sufficient resources provided by the international 
community. While looking at Cote d’Ivoire and Central African Republic we notice the 
difference in impact that the recommended policies have had on the countries. Cote 
d’Ivoire may be the success story to development assistance or may just be proof of the 
necessary components needed for successful policies, in contract to, Central African 
Republic being the mere example of how African countries that continue to hold 
convoluted conflicts affect and are result of poverty.  
Through process tracing I analyze the historical background of these post-conflict 
countries and draw out the similarities that they hold. This most similar design helps to 
distinguish the necessary stability within the country’s infrastructure needed in order to 
acquire policies recommended by the World Bank as well as the benefits that the 
international community has of the prosperity from certain countries more than others. 
By analyzing World Bank policies I was able to draw out the importance of 
institutional stability as well as shared fundamentals in governance, corruption, and 
economic policies in order to be suitable recipients to recommended policies to 
subsequently become active participants in the international market. 
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Introduction 
The World Bank has targeted poverty with policies that have at times driven some 
African countries into economic stability and other times into worse conditions where 
poverty isn’t alleviated. The World Bank’s policies have been modified over the years to 
adhere to the changing international system. Due to a more integrated international 
system, policies are now reflecting general solutions that deprive countries from 
receiving appropriate direction that consider the local politics, economy, and culture. 
These changing dynamics questions whether the local conditions of countries are taken 
into account when policies are recommended. Development assistance cannot be 
approached with a standard model applied for all developing countries, especially in the 
African continent where violence, turmoil, and instability have overwhelmed the 
continent for decades. Development assistance may affect some countries positively and 
help in combatting poverty levels and reduce mortality while in other cases may cause 
even more distress through increased corruption and unresolved needs. Therefore my 
research will focus on the conditions in which the World Bank recommends policies and 
the results are successful, in contrast with the miscalculated factors of the country’s 
policies that result negatively.  
This thesis will argue that considering the variation in political and economic 
status among African countries in the past 10 to 15 years, the African countries’ unique 
political and social circumstances should be recognized by development agencies, such as 
the World Bank, when intervening on the continent.  
I hypothesize that certain African countries are doing better than others under 
World Bank assistance when there is a critical analysis of the current situation and an 
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opportunity to benefit from the stability of the country. By this I mean that if a country 
has potential extractive resources available and a promising political landscape, meaning 
stabilized functioning institutions and systems, the World Bank is more likely to provide 
programs that can maximize their profit in the long term and therefore benefit the local 
community. I will be able to analyze this, not by looking at the amount of money invested 
in these policies through programs or their longevity, but by the types of projects 
recommended, the type of systems recommended for checks and balances, the World 
Bank’s strategies to follow up with the systems in place, and the overall results. As a 
result of the inappropriate policies there exists the unresolved severity of the 
impoverished countries and even worst, the misallocation of resources that do not benefit 
the actual population. 
 I will be looking at two countries to help distinguish why they have had different 
outcomes when it comes to development assistance. The first, Cote d’Ivoire, has been 
relatively effective in taking advantage of development assistance since emerging from a 
decade of conflict in 2011. Cote d’Ivoire is located facing the Atlantic coast. It gained 
independence in 1960 and currently has a strong executive power which is their 
President. Its comparative advantage is cocoa and coffee through its dominant cash-crop 
production. The country currently holds six ethnic groups. Core d’Ivoire has developed 
social safety nets which have focused on building human capital through cash transfers. 
Through their safety nets there has been an accurate mechanism that targets and identifies 
the poor by providing nutrition support, social services or productive and revenue 
generating activities. The Ivorians basic needs of nutrition are being addressed while also 
their civil and social rights are being acknowledged through the provided tools; 
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education, medical care and housing. With the ability to produce income, the people of 
Cote d’Ivoire can feel motivated and have the ability to contribute to the growing 
economy. Cote d’Ivoire has been ranked among top 10 reformers by the World Bank in 
2014.1 They produce light manufacturing, services, and agriculture. Cote d’Ivoire is 
ranked 24 out of 54 countries in Sustainable Economic Opportunity in the Ibrahim Index 
of African Governance. In the Human Development Index, considering welfare, 
education, health, it ranked 40. For Safety and Rule of Law, considering accountability, 
personal security, national security, it ranked 37. For the participation in human rights, it 
ranked 25.2 In terms of transparency international index it ranked 107.3 According to the 
World Bank data Cote d’Ivoire is considered a low mid income country with a population 
of 22.16 million. Their poverty rate is 46.3% and as of 2013 the life expectancy has been 
51 years of age. In sum, despite ongoing high rates of poverty, Cote d’Ivoire has made 
rapid economic progress and has had an increase in political stability while taking 
advantage of World Bank loans since the end of a protracted internal conflict.4   
 Central African Republic, on the other hand, differs in certain ways from Cote 
d’Ivoire. Central African Republic is a landlocked country. Central African Republic also 
obtained independence in 1960 from France. It experienced various factions leading 
ethnic and religious cleansing and displacing many people during 2013 and 2014. The 
comparative advantage is uranium reserves, crude oil, gold, diamonds, cobalt, lumber, 
and hydropower, as well as arable land. It currently has alarming indicators of poverty, 
sustainable economy, safety and Rule of Law, corruption and in their participation in 
                                                          
1 World Bank Group     Most improved in Doing Business  2015    
2 Mo Ibrahim Foundation     Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)  
3 Transparency International  
4 The World Bank  
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human rights. Central African Republic ranks low in all aspects. For sustainable 
economic opportunity it ranked 50 making it a 26 place difference in comparison to Cote 
d’Ivoire’s numbers. In human development it ranked 53, a 13 place difference to Cote d’ 
Ivoire. In safety and rule of law it ranked 53, a 28 place difference. Their human rights 
rank was 46, a 21 place difference to Cote d’Ivoire.5 And as for their transparency it 
ranked 150, a 35 place difference to Cote d’Ivoire.6 The largest rank difference turns out 
to be the transparency international index and safety and rule of law followed by 
sustainable economic opportunity being the third worst ranking indicator. This indicates 
that in order to address the poverty issue in Central African Republic the issue of 
corruption needs to be first addressed. 
  Thus the question remains: why, despite their similarities, has World Bank 
assistance had different effects in Cote d’Ivoire and in the Central African Republic? 
What do the different levels of effectiveness that each country has had in utilizing World 
Bank aid reveal about the conditions under which aid can be effective more generally? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
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Literature Review 
The World Bank has been previously critiqued for its imperialistic methods when 
pursuing neoliberal approaches in all developing countries without considering the 
different factors of the countries. Their once common but not so popular Structural 
Adjustment Programs were said to only focus on surface problems, address problems that 
create more challenges and not impact progress despite its large sum of investment.7  
The World Bank consists of four financing arms; the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, International 
Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency in which provide 
diverse financing programs, lasting markets, and institutions. In terms of development, 
the Bank assists investors from abroad or companies at home in the private sector. Their 
focus is on market economies that can participate in an open international system by 
providing diverse financing opportunities. The Bank has currently modified its approach 
through providing more focused projects and better monitoring strategies.8Due to the 
World Bank’s initial purpose to improve economies, a more business approach has been 
established when assisting developing countries instead of reinforcing the immediate 
need to attend to the social and political problem poverty creates. This approach 
demonstrates that the World Bank is interested in first hand business partnerships with 
developing countries and secondly they’re interested in building partnerships that can be 
                                                          
7 John Pender      From 'Structural Adjustment' to 'Comprehensive Development Framework': 
Conditionality Transformed?     Third World Quarterly Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001), pp. 397-411 
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 
8 Robert B. Zoellick       Why We Still Need the World Bank: Looking Beyond Aid    Foreign Affairs Vol. 
91, No. 2 (MARCH/APRIL 2012), pp. 66-78   Published by: Council on Foreign Relations 
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systematically compatible to the way international institutions work. If these partnerships 
happen to contribute in diminishing the causes of poverty then that’s a bonus. 
Winters states that the World Bank has a criterion for the type of projects 
countries receive that depend on the quality of their economic policies and the quality of 
their governing institutions. There is a preference over countries that have rule-of law 
institutions, governance, and democracy. For countries that have bad governance 
characteristics, they receive project aid consisting of specific investment loans. The better 
governed countries receive programmatic aid, which involves budgetary support or 
structural adjustment lending. The funding packages are meant to create responsible 
stakeholders. The World Bank aims to contribute to long term investments by investing 
in infrastructure in order to create jobs, increase productivity for the future, and raise 
demand for machinery and services that foster safety nets. The World Bank denies clients 
that don’t meet standards and safeguards; corruption, the environment, and governance.  
The developing countries are the World Bank’s clients and the Bank relies on 
them as subjects to apply its economic ideas, development models, investment and 
foreign aid. Developing countries have supported the existence of the World Bank and its 
functions as they provide two thirds of all economic growth of the last five years. Being 
that these countries lack the first world institutions, systems, technology etc., they 
provide a platform for innovation without the constraints that established countries may 
enforce. Developing countries may be more flexible in terms of acquiring suggested 
projects and policies because of their need of assistance. Considering that development is 
not just economic but also political and cultural, there is an issue with the way that the 
knowledge of Africa is produced. This affects how development policy and practice is 
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influenced. There has been evidence that when the World Bank analysts didn’t have 
background knowledge of African countries or there was a lack of understanding of the 
developing countries’ dilemmas the program’s effectiveness suffered. However, in recent 
years there has been a push to improve the Bank’s diversity where now 50% of the 
executive directors of the organization come from developing countries, and its 
employees come from 167 different countries. 9  
The World Bank is known to be a macrocosm agency, multifaceted with many 
responsibilities that can overlap from being a financial agency to a development 
benefactor. For that reason its politics reinforces compliance, mainstreaming, and 
dissemination of norms being constructed to guide the developing countries towards 
stabilization.  Through the process of developing countries adapting the norms it 
conceptualizes a cohesive perception of what poverty, corruption, inequality etc. is. 
These international norms are penetrated through domestic legal systems and therefore 
internalized. While the World Bank has difficulty consolidating core sustainable norms 
that can be effective across diverse cultures and political systems, its operational policies 
are becoming global standards among development agencies. In spite of its internal 
systematic inconsistencies, the World Bank provides indicators in practice for global 
governance and rule of law which displays a paradox of governance where political 
systems and institutions would be legitimate under a particular prototype. It is evident 
that the production of the statistical measures they produce has embedded theories and 
values that influence decisions.  The data collection that is gathered and used as methods 
                                                          
9 MATTHEW S. WINTERS  CHOOSING TO TARGET: What Types of Countries Get Different Types of 
World Bank Projects  World Politics Vol. 62, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 422-458 Published by: Cambridge 
University Press 
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of analysis in the international community comes from developmental countries and only 
contains the narratives that pertain to the developing countries. For that reason, there is a 
red flag towards the concept of development assistance. It does not help to recognize the 
World Bank’s history on reporting skewed data in order to reinforce what was the 
dominant policy agenda, neoliberalism.10 
Building on this point and through considering James Ferguson’s The Anti-
Politics Machine, we can integrate the idea that the World Bank constructs what we have 
been told is a ‘developing’ country and in so that the very problems they identify can be 
solved by them.  The World Bank needs to find problems that they can solve and the case 
of Lesotho serves as an example. Lesotho’s problems were framed to be within its 
borders. The language used in the World Bank report to describe Lesotho such as “less 
developed”, would indicate the appropriate solutions. Poverty within less developed 
countries indicated that the necessary solution would be the participation in the modern 
economy, capitalism. But Ferguson argued that capitalism doesn’t alleviate poverty 
instead it creates a greater inequality between the wealthy and the poor.11 Ferguson’s 
arguments are still relevant in today’s World Bank approaches. The World Bank’s ‘less 
developed’ label created indicators that are still used today to specify who is considered a 
developing country. Most importantly, I think the same mistakes may be currently 
occurring when the Bank reports on a country’s developmental status without conducting 
a full analysis of the country. 
                                                          
10 Research, Knowledge, and the Art of 'Paradigm Maintenance': The World Bank's Development 
Economics Vice-Presidency (DEC)  Robin Broad Source: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 
13, No. 3 (Aug., 2006), pp. 387-419 
11 James Ferguson   The Anti-Politics Machine “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power 
in Lesotho University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London 
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As a result of the existing literature, I am interested in elaborating on how the 
World Bank’s strategy in providing particular projects according to economic policy and 
governing institutions systematically produces policies bound for failure. The prerequisite 
of having rule of law institutions, good governance, and democracy in order to receive 
programmatic aid assumes a more advanced consideration of the recipient country as 
opposed to project aid that is more narrow in its goal. Perhaps, it is legitimate to state that 
providing programmatic aid to countries with large amount of resources and similar 
preferences to the donor proves that the World Bank’s effectiveness may only be 
accomplished in countries that have compatible structures thus the other countries are 
mere test samples of policies that aren’t expected to succeed.  
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Argument 
 This thesis will argue that poverty has been difficult to address because what has 
been proposed as solutions do not consider the different components; culture, economy 
and political system, that each country may have. Poverty has been used as a political 
tool by development agencies, such as the World Bank, to drive in institutions and 
systems through their recommendations that require compatible systems for them to 
succeed which creates a standard functionality in the international community. This is 
why in order to actually reduce poverty, the perspective and approach to development 
assistance needs to be reformed. In looking at the local circumstances we can better 
understand the political, cultural, and economic differences that can attribute to finding 
suitable solutions for the specific country. 
Poverty has become an international dilemma which has caused the dynamics of 
the nation-state to change. Particularly, because of the instability of post-conflict 
countries, the severity of poverty becomes part of the international agenda. A country’s 
instability caused by conflict can produce a collapse in existing institutions or deallocate 
resources needed to create institutions. Walt states that institutions can be a source of 
cooperation and interdependence where countries willing to dismiss their own interests 
are able to participate and reap the benefits of international cooperation by accepting 
international organizations and nongovernmental actors in helping to shape state 
preferences and policy choices. He first explains that institutions don’t undermine the 
nation-state system; 
Liberal institutions likewise have continued to adapt their own theories. On the 
one hand, the core claims of institutionalist theory have become more modest 
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over time. Institutions are now said to facilitate cooperation when it is in each 
state’s interest to do so, but it is widely agreed that they cannot force states to 
behave in ways that are contrary to the states’ own selfish interests.12 
 
Walt goes on stating that the latter is what was understood the role of institutions to be in 
the international community but the growing interdependence with the globalization of 
the market, transnational networks, nongovernmental organizations, communications etc. 
has shifted the global attention from security awareness to economic and social welfare. 
Sharing fundamental beliefs helps organizations like the World Bank be able to impact 
developing countries through their development programs. The example that Barnett and 
Duvall give is how multinational corporations can use their control over capital to shape 
the foreign economic policies of developing states, as well as global economic policies.13 
Liberalism contributors state that the power dynamics within non-state actors and nation 
states do not level out and countries or actors in power become more powerful as weak 
states remain weak.  The liberalism school of thought helps us understand why the 
rhetoric of institutions (the importance of strengthening them) can create cooperation 
with non-state actors and so are willing to become interdependent with international 
institutions such as the World Bank. For countries that don’t obtain these connections, 
they can have difficulty complying with the recommended policies and can appear not 
interested in participating in international relations. 
                                                          
12  Stephen M. Walt       International Relations: One World, Many Theories  Foreign Policy 
No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29-32+34-46 
13 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall     Power in International Politics  George Washington University 
2005 
 14 
 
Institutions shape the social and political world by shaping the choices available. 
They provide incentives for people to act (or not) in a given matter. Institutions have the 
power to shape the way society evolves, hence, can be used to understand historical 
change. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson state that a country’s institutions are the 
product of the colonial institutions. Settlers were more likely to establish constructive 
institutions, likely to lead to ongoing investment over time because of secure property 
rights and non-extortionate policies, where there were low mortality rates. Consequently 
the type of institution may have an impact on the country’s income per capita. The 
quality of institutions can be determined by the colonizers and whether they established 
extractive or constructive institutions.14  
Institutions can serve as a form of hegemony despite a country’s political system, 
economy, and culture. They provide structures that can monitor, set norms, and reinforce 
compliance. By controlling the power structure of a country through institutions, the 
World Bank, can have a direct effect on the relationships and behaviors that are the result 
of those power interactions, whether they are indirect or direct. Institutions that can be 
used as puppets allow the World Bank to be the puppeteers. If current institutions are 
flexible but still formulated they can serve as a tool for proposed goals based on 
frameworks that narrow their approach in order to achieve those goals, as opposed to not 
having any institutions that would serve as transfer points of power. Institutions frame 
targets and shape them in a way that can consolidate a goal. By consolidating goals, the 
possibility of any other factors that can cause them to stray away from their goal will be 
eliminated. Autesserre refers to this as narratives that are constructed to engage external 
                                                          
14 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson   The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation    June 2000  
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actors to simple and easy solutions. Simplifying the violence in Congo to just one conflict 
involving illegal resource exploitation, that resulted in sexual violence against women 
and girls, promoted the idea of the need to reconstruct state authority but didn’t solve the 
core reasons for the conflict. Through targeting warlords and identifying them as 
perpetrators made the narrative concrete but resulted with rebel groups using sexual 
violence as leverage to obtain attention from the international community.15 Framing a 
problem can allow an institution to be able to focus all its resources and educate itself 
into finding a solution for it. It eliminates factors that if were considered would make it 
harder to find solutions to. Also, it allows for investors to be more convinced on how 
their contributions can make a difference and the public will know exactly the problem 
and the necessary solution, thus a larger supportive network would be available. The 
issue with creating simplified narratives is that many African dilemmas have been 
addressed with this very mentality. Too many factors have been set aside and ignored 
when analyzing these countries like the origin of the conflicts, culture of decolonization, 
unstable economy or the informal economies along with informal institutions that have 
been built as a result of the instability and the systematic reliance on the international 
economy. Political systems are different in developing countries therefore adhering to a 
democratic political party may be irrelevant to them if it is not pertinent to the country’s 
power structure. If critical apparatuses are not acknowledged, policies can be lost in 
translation. The local circumstances should be accounted for when assisting post-conflict 
countries because many times these countries hold a history that can explain their current 
                                                          
15 Severine Autesserre    Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended 
Consequences  African Affairs 00/00, 1-21 Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal 
Affairs Society. 
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economic and political circumstances. International organizations like the World Bank 
may continue to work at the international or national level without having to necessarily 
invest too much into the micro dynamics of a country but the transformative progress can 
only be made with a new approach and mindset. Once we begin to question the current 
approaches to development, systematic, and political assistance we may find better 
appropriate solutions. 
Understanding that institutions can provide cooperation, flexibility, and adherence 
to the norms within the international community makes is plausible for organizations like 
the World Bank to form partnerships with countries that may have a stable system in 
place. Institutional stability can facilitate compatible recommendations. Stability doesn’t 
just allow for the World Bank to better assess the situation but can also translate into 
shared fundamentals between the World Bank and the recipient country. Institutions may 
be structures with historical background, nonetheless, the country’s present leaders are 
held accountable for the country’s current dynamics. So Central African Republic’s 
partial democratic political system is a choice that the elites have continued to enforce, 
consequently, transpires as being an uncooperative in international politics. A country’s 
incongruent institutions from the World Bank’s functions may result in policies that 
would be ineffective, as well, not providing systems for checks and balances.  Needless 
to say, it would not be worth for the World Bank to invest its progressive 
recommendations on Central African Republic because of their continuous conflicts 
within its borders and its peripheral boundaries unless the Central African Republic is 
willing to appear to be interested in participating in the international community by 
obtaining a democratic system.  On the other hand, Cote d’Ivoire has shown their 
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cooperative ways; adapting to a democratic presidential system, which has subsequently 
welcomed increased relations leading to their growing economy. 
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Research Design 
To understand development assistance we must first have a clear understanding of 
the dynamics of the developing countries. Once we can differentiate between the 
dynamics we are able to take a closer look at the role development organizations play 
when providing assistance. The results of the World Bank’s policies have made me 
question why particular policies, although applied to similar countries, have different 
outcomes. I argue that when developing countries have strong existing institutions, World 
Bank policies are more likely to be effective. These developing countries have stable 
institutions and share the Bank’s preferences within democracy, extractive economy, and 
profitable resources thus motivates them to take a better account of local situations that 
will ultimately address the core problems of poverty in the country. 
Cote d’Ivoire and Central African Republic have had opposite experience in 
putting World Bank aid to use, despite having key similarities that might explain those 
differences, including shared histories of being French colonies, shared histories of 
authoritarianism with fragile democratic interludes, and having each emerged from recent 
conflict. These similarities make it easier to analyze why the World Bank policies 
recommended to Cote d’Ivoire have resulted in relative success (defined as rapid growth) 
as opposed to Central African Republic which continues to be overcome by poverty and 
instability. By understanding the discrepancy in the outcomes of development assistance 
we can better understand how to systemically target poverty in post-conflict African 
countries. We can have a better idea of what should be kept into consideration when 
creating recommendations to countries that don’t seem to be responding to past 
suggestions and assistance. 
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In order to better understand why particular World Bank policies impact both 
these countries differently, despite their similarities, I will deploy a “Most Similar 
Systems” research design in order to anticipate possible alternative explanations for the 
effectiveness of World Bank policies in post-conflict countries. A Most Similar Design 
acknowledges the importance of similarities between systems but also recognizes that 
differences explain the outcome of interest. As Przeworski and Teune argue, 
“intersystemic similarities and intersystemic differences are the focus of the “most 
similar systems” design. Systems constitute the original level of analysis, and within-
system variations are explained in terms of systemic factors.”16 Such a design, therefore, 
will allow me to isolate causal processes that lead countries to developmental success or 
failure. 
It is important to acknowledge Cote d’Ivoire’s current political framework of 
presidential representative democratic republic and Central African Republic’s semi 
presidential republic with a split power system between the president and the prime 
minister. The representative democracy is a known western political system and holds 
theoretical evidence that supports the idea of states becoming accountable for conflicts 
and are prone to public wealth through building and fostering relationships with non-state 
actors.17 These intersystem differences can perhaps say something about the way the 
local politics is handled in both of these countries which can determine whether local 
politics are a critical factor when recommending policies. Another difference that should 
be noted is the geographical location of these countries. Central African Republic is a 
                                                          
16 Adam Przeworski/ Henry Teune   The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry      Wiley-Interschience  
17 Christopher Layne    Kant or cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace    International Security, Volume 
19, Issue 2, (Autumn, 1994), 5-49. 
 20 
 
landlocked country, whereas, Cote d’Ivoire is located in the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. 
The increased prosperity could perhaps be attributed to this factor because of the 
facilitation of the exporting of goods, even though, their different geographies is not 
sufficient to explain the differences in each country’s performance. By looking at 
recommended post conflict programs for the countries, while observing the sector the 
programs aim to affect, can help determine if the World Bank approach is pursuing the 
appropriate sectors that would alleviate poverty. The particular policies recommended, in 
relation to the local events occurring in the country, can be indication of how vigilant the 
World Bank’s analysis was in producing their suggestions. I think it would be beneficial 
to compare the results of the program to how effective it was to the country’s current 
status.  
  In addition to conducting comparative research via a Most Similar Systems 
design, I will utilize process-tracing to investigate the underlying mechanisms leading to 
a more effective development aid in some circumstances and less effective development 
aid in others. We can get a better understanding of why the policies best suit Cote 
d’Ivoire and not CAR by understanding the process instead of merely analyzing the 
outcome. In doing so, we can better understand development assistance. Particularly in 
process-tracing there is a dual importance of historical events and case studies. Therefore 
historical events are not isolated and can be used as applied knowledge to the case 
studies. It would be informative to also research what related events, policies, took place 
in the international community to perhaps find commonalities.  
  By using the method of Process tracing I'll be able to observe linkages within the 
case studies that can support or dispute my hypotheses on World Bank policies being 
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more effective when local politics are considered and how the stability of the country is 
beneficial to the international community. As mentioned before, the political systems and 
current institutions may be a point of analysis that may hold weight on whether or not a 
country benefits from these policies. As George and Bennett argue,   
“Process-tracing can identify single or different paths to an outcome, point out 
variables that was otherwise left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for 
spuriousness and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases or even a 
single case.”18  
Through process-training I intend in using the narrative to develop hypotheses that would 
either support existing theories of development assistance or demonstrate the need for the 
consideration to develop a more cohesive theory to explain the process of development 
assistance. The current existing literature on development assistance has either depicted 
recipient countries as helpless dependent beggars or con artists in the aid game. There is a 
lack of literature that speaks about the World Bank system in relation to the recipient 
country’s system and whether or not these systems are able to successfully acquire the 
assistance where they can get maximized outcomes in, exactly why I am interested in 
observing both these countries process before and during the World Bank’s assistance to 
better comprehend the assistance process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett   Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences  
MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts  
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The story of Cote d’Ivoire 
 Cote d’Ivoire has become the Cinderella story of African countries. This once 
unstable country has shaped the way many now view the potential of developing 
countries to be. Its multifaceted story is not one of happy endings that were accomplished 
without a fight. It consists of the fight for prosperity, ethnic leverage, and nationalism 
against one’s fear of the international community undermining the country’s ability to 
stand on its own feet. What many can describe as the “Big Brother”, the presence of 
France along with the International community, has demonstrated the intricateness of the 
Franco-African or the Franco-Ivorian relationship which has been more dynamically 
intertwined with third party actors then many have admitted. Cote d’Ivoire’s story 
consists of a country whose post-independence prosperity is set by its well established 
institutions under French colonialism and as a result has been able to adhere to the World 
Bank’s policies. 
Cote d’Ivoire consists of different ethnic groups within its Muslim and Christian 
population. Even though the country has more than sixty ethnic groups, they have over 
time, consolidated to five major groups; Akan (east and center, including Lagoon peoples 
of the southeast), Krou (southwest), Southern Mandé (west), Northern Mandé 
(northwest), Sénoufo/Lobi (north center and northeast) but can be identified 
predominately within the Islamic or Christian religion. The north consists of mainly the 
Muslims and Christians are in the southern areas of the country.19 The institution of 
religion allows for a condensation of the different ethnic groups, making them easy to be 
differentiated especially in politics.   
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Many of these ethnic dynamics first emerged under the rule of Felix Houphouet-
Boigny.  Houphouet-Boigny was the first president of Cote d’Ivoire following its 
independence from France in 1960. His presidency ended with his death after thirty-three 
years of authoritarian rule. During the ‘70s and ‘80s, Houphouet-Boigny developed a 
policy that promoted ethnic unity and political stability through the migration of northern 
laborers, as a means to keep up with the growing production of cocoa in the west that 
stirred tensions between the ethnic groups. The growing production of cocoa and 
Houphouet-Boigny’s political stance to expand on it demonstrates that Cote d’Ivoire in 
its earliest years has been exploiting its resources. It also displays Houphouet-Boigny’s 
ability to leverage the international market by creating a market that would benefit both 
the Ivorian’s and its consumers. Houphouet-Boigny’s political move was intended to 
enhance his popularity within the northern part of Cote d’Ivoire but instead the surge of 
migrants infuriated many Ivorian’s producing feelings of marginalization and an anti-
immigration sentiment. This division has haunted Cote d’Ivoire and has caused political 
turmoil. Boone explains the politics of Houphouet-Boigny rule as follows, 
state-builders in Cote d’Ivoire institutionalized regional divisions and ethnicized 
regional constituencies as building blocks of the national polity. Within political 
spaces so structured, the regime used administrative controls over resources, 
resource flows, and market access to enforce the political coherence of regions 
and regional alliance defined by the center, and to manage local and interregional 
tensions.20 
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Boone pointed out how Houphouet-Boigny used territorial politics to its advantage for 
the economic liberalization and the shift to an open economy in Cote d’Ivoire. When 
global cocoa prices declined in the 90s, the hostility among the Ivorian’s became even 
more apparent with the increase of unemployment. Regardless of Houphouet-Boigny 
authoritarian one-party system, farmers in the north responded to the economic crisis by 
forming small farmer’s unions which then led transporters and taxi drivers to go on strike 
because of the road blocks instituted by policemen and the members of the military. This 
effective strike fused an upheaval from student protests against austerity programs on 
students caused by the inability to hold the government accountable, to police and 
firefighters joining the protest against their low wages during the economic crisis, 
subsequently all leading to Houphouet-Boigny ushering a multiparty system.21 
As a result of the turmoil, multiparty elections were organized in 1990. The fact 
that Cote d’Ivoire was able to host multi-party elections, during its early stages as an 
independent nation, indicates that there were relatively strong institutions in place even 
during the authoritarian rule of Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Multi-party elections consisted 
of Houphouet-Boigny running against his opponent Laurent Gbagbo with the Ivoirian 
Popular Front (FPI) party.  Houphouet-Boigny won the elections and continued his 
presidency until his death when Henri Konan Bedie, the president of the National 
Assembly, was elected transitional president in 1993 until the next election, as indicated 
in the constitution.  
Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie shared the same ethnic group, Akan. Contrast to 
Houphouet-Boigny politics that focused on the unification of all ethnic groups, Bedie’s 
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rule consisted of the discrimination against the northerners to gain political support from 
the southerners, the ethnic group he belonged to, and who opposed the northerners. 
Elected presidents are known to support the ethnic group they belong to hence why 
backlash may occur when an opposing candidate is elected. With the knowledge of 
African politics, it’s comprehensible that African leaders hold on to their ethnic identity 
and use it as a political tool to either pool in supporters or create a focus of the population 
they’ll be representing. Bedie strategically used this as leverage to exclude Alassane 
Outarra from running against him in the 1995 elections by identifying Outarra as a 
foreigner, he had previously worked for the IMF and held a Burkinabe passport. 
President Alassane Ouatarra had a pre-established relationship with the international 
community and France, who supported him in becoming president by internationally 
recognizing him as president and supporting his attempt to overthrow Laurent Gbagbo. 
Ouatarra was considered to be the accredited president in the eyes of the international 
community contrary to who the Ivorian’s acknowledged as president, Gbagbo.22  
There was an attempted coup in 2002 led by northern army officers in response to 
Gbagbo’s exclusion of northerners in the government and military. The division of power 
and ethnic groups had unfolded yet again. Guillaume Soro led the New Forces (NF) into 
gaining control of the northern part of the country, which resulted into a civil war. The 
conflict was said to consist of ethnic, religious, and regional tensions where the Christian 
southern government fought the Muslim northern rebels.  
International investors can become reluctant to continue doing business with 
countries like Cote d’Ivoire due to its violent turmoil. To investors, those types of 
                                                          
22 Peace Direct 
 26 
 
circumstances may seem too dire to invest in, more is at stake than to profit from. It is 
important to keep in mind that the drop of cocoa prizes was global, which might have 
served as an incentive to pull investments out of Cote d’Ivoire. For Cote d’Ivoire there 
weren’t many more options of what to economically rely on so the dependency on their 
export economy, without it producing much profit, rightfully caused economic and social 
distress. Many workers were forced to relocate, not just from one part of the country to 
another, but also change the industry they worked in to keep up with the changing 
market.  
This drastic change demonstrates the unreliability of the international market for 
those economies that depend mostly on their export economy. Economies like that of 
Cote d’Ivoire rely on agriculture because they don’t have the industrial commerce that 
developed countries may have, in which may give them a variety of incomes to depend 
on. Collier suggests that economies that are diverse and dependent on more than one 
source of income are prone to be more stable and less likely to experience civil war. He 
also states that the greater the diversity within a population the higher chance of 
conflict.23 His implications can be applied to Cote d’Ivoire’s initial struggles that were 
stirred up with the economic instability that began with the production of cocoa. Cocoa 
had paved the way of wealth for Cote d’Ivoire in in the years of Felix Houphouet-Boigny. 
Up until the global drop of the cocoa prices many lived off of this popular commodity. 
From the years 2000-2001 Cote d’Ivoire was recorded to have a lower GDP per Capita in 
comparison to the other African countries, similar to its GDP per capita recordings of 
1994.  
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During the crisis in 2002 that affected Cote d’Ivoire, there was a halt in the 
production of tobacco, cotton, sugar and cashew nuts which were being produced in the 
areas occupied by the rebels. Cocoa as well as coffee were produced outside conflict 
zones but still affected the marketing problems that the conflict caused.  The firms that 
were inside the conflict zones were located in the center or north of the country. They 
processed mostly agricultural products such as cotton, tobacco and sugar or worked on 
the packaging of the products. For the companies located outside of the conflict zones, 
they weren’t able to receive the raw material thus had lower consumer demand. 
Agriculture being the primary sector employed 60 per cent of the male and 75 per cent of 
the female working population.  
The frustration that emerged followed a demand for the government to provide 
solutions to both the urban and rural populations. Liberia, who was also having a civil 
war at the same time that the Ivorian crisis was becoming heightened, allegedly provided 
mercenaries to both the Ivorian government and rebel groups. Killings, mutilation, sexual 
violence against women and girls, and forced labour was said to have taken place during 
this time. According to the UN between 1,500 and 2,500 Liberians were involved in 
fighting against the Ivorian government and 1,000 were involved in the fights against the 
rebels. Both are said, to have recruited children to fight.24   
Pro-Gbagbo sentiments lingered after the violence receded by militia groups that 
described themselves as “self-defense units”. While attacks on UN personnel took place 
by angered youths from the town of Guiglo, there was also anti-UN rioting occurring in 
Abidjan.  UN Security Council deployed 200 peacekeeping troops for two months. FN 
                                                          
24 Ibid 
 28 
 
and the government were held responsible for using militias that were accused of acts of 
violence. The pro-government militias held significant capacity to create unrest and 
insecurity. They were financed by the presidential camp. Gbagbo’s presidency was called 
a “constitutional dictatorship” as the author goes on to explain; 
The government-held zone, cocoa, oil, timber, and coffee account for a significant 
proportion of the government’s budget. The Ivorian economy and national 
finances have always suffered from a lack of transparency, but the current crisis 
has further facilitated corruption and lack of accountability in the exploitation of 
natural resources.25 
 
By 2004 the violence had calmed down partly because of the creation of the UN 
Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the intervention of French troops. The French 
presence had caused insecurity, mainly for Gbagbo’s presidency as he felt the need to 
fight for Cote d’Ivoire’s second independence. Various events took place that would be 
evidence for Gbagbo of the French overstepping the sovereign rights of Cote d’Ivoire. 
The visit to the rebel territory of Bouake by the French Foreign Affairs Minister 
Dominique de Villepin attracted a lot of attention from the international media as well as 
the Linas-Marcoussis and Kleber negotiations that legitimized and internationally 
recognized the rebellion, resulted with the nomination of a transitional Prime Minister 
that would reduce the Gbagbo’s political power.  
The fact that France intervened into the Ivorian crisis demonstrates that it had 
much to loose from the instability in Cote d’Ivoire. France’s presence in rebel territory 
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portrayed an manipulative concern towards the rebels and the corruption that loiter Cote 
d’Ivoire since it’s evident that the country’s economy was on the line and Gbagbo was 
not in support of affiliations with France or the international community. Civil wars can 
destroy physical and human capital, disrupt trade, divert inflow of foreign direct 
investment, redirect government expenditures, cause homes to be repossessed by rebel 
control, breakdown the health infrastructure, decrease accessibility to medical care, 
scarce the clean water supply, delay sanitation infrastructure etc.26 So finding ways to 
overthrow Gbagbo and assuring that he would be convicted for the crimes he was 
accused of committing would allow him to be replaced by someone who already had a 
good relationship with the international community and France, Alassane Ouatarra.  
The Ouagadougou Agreement signed by Gbagbo and Soro, split the power 
between the two where Soro was named the Prime Minister. Later on in the elections 
between Gbagbo and Ouatarra in 2010, Ouatarra was announced the winner by the 
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI).  Conflicted by those results, the Constitutional 
Council (CC) declared them invalid and instead named Gbagbo the president. There was 
a violent response to the news and the split of power once again torn the country. The 
international community, in hopes of mediating the dispute, supported Ouatarra but that 
didn’t encourage Gbagbo to step down from his position as president.  Inconclusively, the 
violence was reignited between Gbagbo loyalists and Ouatarra’s Republican Forces of 
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the Ivory Coast (FRCI) with the support of the French and UN troops, which eventually 
led to the defeat of Gbagbo’s forces in April 2011.27 
France’s role in the mediation of the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire is essential. 
Whether France genuinely assisted in providing peace efforts to dissipate the political 
tensions that kept reoccurring in Cote d’Ivoire because of their concern of the future of 
Cote d’Ivoire or their interventions were just mere examples of post-colonialism 
interventions, would depend on whether one sees colonialism as an evaporation of 
cultural diversity or a systematic mentorship. Either way, because of France’s political 
power and international role they were able to maneuver the necessary actions to respond 
to the violence. 
Certain countries and international institutions were depicted as proxies or 
instruments in France’s hands, devoid of any autonomy. The role of France at the 
Security Council, as permanent member, lead country on the Ivoirian dossier and 
author of the first draft of the resolutions taken by the UN on Cote d’Ivoire, 
provided the means for presenting the UN as substantially an appendix of France 
or a Western imperialism-dominated institution.28 
The Lina-Marcoussis agreement for the 2010 election had three approaches that were 
used by the international community; to acknowledge Gbagbo’s concern of the 
international community’s intervention in Ivorian’s conflict and allow African regional 
and sub-regional organizations to take initiative and equating the power that was 
distributed between the President and the prime minister, the second was to use sanctions 
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that granted Gbagbo an additional year of presidency but as Head of State, the third 
involved enforcing Resolutions 163329 and 172130  which held weak mechanisms for 
punishing non-compliance. These efforts were created as incentive for Gbagbo’s 
cooperation in the peace process. The elections of 2010 were foreseen by OPA and 
resulted with recognizing Ouatarra’s government as the legal (within Ivorian 
constitutional restraints) and legitimate (within the international community) in Cote 
d’Ivoire.31 
  
World Bank Policies for Cote d’Ivoire 
 The World Bank has been able to assist in the reconstruction of Cote d’Ivoire 
despite the instability that was caused by the civil war. Essentially, the World Bank 
policies have assisted Cote d’Ivoire through their focus on Cote d’Ivoire’s comparative 
advantage and through focusing on fortifying its institutions. By looking at World Bank 
project reports we can distinguish the types of World Bank policies recommended to 
Cote d’Ivoire with focus on the agricultural sector and on institutional development. 
Looking at the agricultural sector is relevant since Cote d’Ivoire’s history of gaining 
wealth has been from their cocoa exports. In analyzing the recommended policies for 
Cote d’Ivoire would indicate if they were merely recommendations based off of strategies 
to exploit the natural resources or they were well thought out proposals that consisted of a 
concrete analysis of the Ivorian dynamics. The World Bank’s focus on policy 
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recommendations for institution development demonstrates the aim to provide the 
necessary maintenance for their established institutions in order for them to better acquire 
the elaborate propositions to expand them. We can depict the indications of the World 
Bank’s projects based upon existing services, industries, and institutions within these 
reports. Lastly, I will like to analyze the end results of the policies implemented to 
understand if there were any systems of checks and balances that were established after 
the project came to an end. 
The World Bank’s Implementation Completion Report for an Economic Recovery 
Credit of 2004 consisted of regulation and competition policy in rural policies and 
institutions, public expenditure, financial management and procurement, education for 
all, health system performance. The project was to focus on the rural economy and 
private sector and to create conditions for renewed broad-based growth, involving local 
communities to improve public sector, and to better manage public resources. Within 
three months of the project’s initiative the impact of civil war began to affect the 
progression of the project. The project aimed to improve the technologies for farmers for 
the continual expansion of the agricultural sector. The project was implemented after a 
pilot operation. Its pilot execution validates the World Bank’s checks and balance system 
before implementation in order to have a concrete analysis of the effectiveness of the 
project which would be more likely to be successful. A pilot execution also demonstrates 
a deeper commitment and investment to the project since additional or flexible funding 
would be required as a result of any change that might emerge prospective expenses. 
Existing extension agencies would generate and disseminate the technologies and then 
monitor and evaluate the project. The report indicates that there was a modest 
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institutional impact and at the project’s services peak 64% of the farmers were reached. 
This extension project was for established institutions. There was a follow-on project that 
was then approved in order to support institutional development once the project was 
completed. An audit was also planned.32A project like this is more than likely to be 
effective. Being that a pilot was conducted demonstrates that there was a critical analysis 
of the local conditions that were considered prior to the implementation of it. Also 
because the project aimed to provide technologies for the farmers working in the 
agriculture sector, which is one of the main sources of revenue for Cote d’Ivoire, displays 
a clear consideration of targeting the source of production and invigorating it so that the 
sector may continue to produce more revenue. The usage of technologies may cause a 
learning curve within farmers that would either slow down production or not be 
completely supported by them. But with a 64 percent reach we can consider that farmers 
were extensively trained and educated on how to use these technologies and why 
obtaining these technologies would be beneficial to them. 
Another World Bank project worth looking at is the Implementation Completion 
and Results Report for Economic and Recovery Grant in 2009 that was to implement the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance to Cote d’Ivoire’s existing institutions. The 
performance ratings for the operation were satisfactory for risks to development outcome, 
Bank performance, and Borrower performance. The project aimed to assist Cote d’Ivoire 
in clearing the debt it had for IBRD and IDA in order for the restoration of relations to 
resume so that post-conflict economic and social recovery support could be granted to 
Cote d’Ivoire.  Restoring relationships between Cote d’Ivoire and the World Bank allude 
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to the close knit relations they had before the civil war that was of interest of both parties. 
The policy areas that the program supported were public expenditure management, 
energy sector, cocoa sector, and financial sector. Prior to the grant, Cote d’Ivoire was set 
to complete seven actions that would facilitate the successful implementation of the 
program intended to improve governance and economic growth.  Without the existence 
of institutions the completion of the actions required would have been unsuccessful and 
thus the grant would’ve not been granted. The program has reduced poverty through the 
increase in the pro-poor spending budget of 2007-2009. This is evidence that Cote 
d’Ivoire has been able to use its institutions and acquire the necessary recommendations 
that would put them in good standing. Through the reengagement of the international 
community Cote d’Ivoire was to receive more support in improving the security situation, 
of which the unification of Cote d’Ivoire and the World Bank relations has resulted in the 
country’s peacefulness. As for the cocoa sector, the operation helped in recognizing the 
governance weakness in the sector which resulted in the dismissal of all senior 
management of the institutions in the cocoa sector in 2008. To replace the management, a 
committee was created to become responsible for reviewing the development strategy 
and to reform the institutional set-up for efficacy and accountability.33 Cote d’Ivoire’s 
previously established institutions have served as a framework that allowed for the World 
Bank’s recommendations to serve as a guide into alleviating poverty. If Cote d’Ivoire 
didn’t previously have institutions, the stable institutions prior to the conflict, the 
recommendations to reform the spending budget and the reconfiguration of the cocoa 
sector would have not been possible. 
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Lastly the Proposed Additional Credit for the Governance and Institutional 
Development Project in 2014 consisted of policy reforms and institutional development 
also focused on the public financial management particularly in the cocoa sector. The 
progression of Cote d’Ivoire’s political stability, displayed with the three functioning 
branches of government and the administration process that was spread through the 
country, eased the facilitation of this project. Notwithstanding the civil war that affected 
the economy, the government was able to sustain its political system and keep a sense of 
structure. For this reason and because of the support of the government the National 
Development Plan was set to be effective.  The National Development Plan was 
established to promote efficiency and effectiveness for the public financial management 
systems to prosper in sectors like the cocoa industry. The country’s economy was able to 
recover from a decline in their GDP. Despite the political turmoil that affected 
governance, the project’s focused on the transparency and flexibility in public funds, that 
would allow the World Bank to get a better analysis of the necessary policies, achieve an 
improved budget preparation and monitoring of debt, improve the public information on 
budgetary allocations and execution, and timely adopt the budget execution review laws. 
The government had developed the National Development Plan from 2012-2015 to which 
intends to lead the country to reach a prosperous economic status by 2020. A plan with a 
timespan of four years confirms not just accountability on the country’s behalf to meet 
the necessary indications to reach the goal but also displays a commitment on behalf of 
the World Bank to follow through this plan until completion. The project has been 
recognized as successful and is rated moderate for risks. The results highlight the 
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effectiveness of the mitigation measures used to contain things like corruption, 
governance and capacity.34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 The World Bank Document    INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION PROJECT 
PAPER ON A PROPOSED ADDITIONAL CREDIT     Report No: PAD1028        May 14, 2014 
 37 
 
The continuous tragedy in Central African Republic 
Similar to Cote d’Ivoire, CAR’s neighboring countries, although CAR is 
landlocked with continuous violence, has contributed to the ongoing conflicts that emerge 
from migration where the history of the effects of identity politics lingers and fuses 
political participation. What begins to differentiate the two countries is their apparatus 
post-independence. Central African Republic’s transition into independence 
foreshadowed an unprogressive future due to its lack of institutions; scarce hospitals, 
limited education system, and the political systems led by French ‘technical advisers’. 
Also its history of being an extractive state explains their current political economy that 
consists of illicit markets, violence, and exploitation. Central African Republic 
demonstrates the horror stories of intervention by non-state actors attributing to the 
existing atrocities taking place. What should have been the assistance from external 
actors towards building stability and the guidance towards the alleviation of poverty 
becomes the violation of power in the name of assistance. CAR has been the epitome of 
international assistance gone wrong. It is a country full of richness and potential 
prosperity with the inability to distribute the wealth of its soil to its inhabitants. Those 
who profit most from the country’s volatility are disguised behind what you would call 
wolves in sheep clothing.  
Central African Republic’s ethnic groups consisted of the “river people” along the 
Oubangui, the pygmies in the equatorial rain forest, the Gbaya in the West, the Mandja in 
the centre, and the Gbanda in the east. Commerce and long distance trade – in addition to 
slave trade was common along the Oubangui River. The Oubangui River facilitated trade 
and commerce. It played an important part in the slave economy which affected the 
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Central African population between the years 1890-1940 leaving only 750,000 
inhabitants. The population later tripled after the country’s independence.  The Wadai 
Sultanate was an empire in present day Chad that conquered territories north of the 
Oubangui River. Central African Republic was coined the ‘Cinderella’ of the French 
Empire, by Jean-Noël Brégeon in 1998, but its non-fairytale endless events clearly 
reveals its continuous triumph to become more than insignificant and (if possible) reach 
the recognition that Cote d’Ivoire has accomplished within the international 
community.35 Relevantly to the Cinderella story, CAR remains as the benefactor that sits 
by the fireplace waiting for its combustible matter to receive the necessary strike so that 
spark of fire can be ignited.  In other words, CAR has the ability to be transformed into 
royalty with the same attention and assistance that Cote d’Ivoire has received.  
The Central African Republic political system’s inconsistency has caused a 
fundamental unpredictability within the political agendas. CAR has a history of various 
political parties where we can begin to unravel the essential reasons why development 
assistance has not been successful. After the independence in 1960, David Dacko was 
elected provisional Chief of the Republic. Two years later his political party Movement 
for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (MESAN) is proclaimed the sole political party 
which facilitated the transition from a constitutional to presidential regime in 1964. But a 
year later a coup emerged led by Jean-Bedel who was Chief of Staff of the Central 
African Army. Jean Bedel Bokassa was proclaimed president for life in 1972 after 
defending the control of the capital Bangui against Jean Izamo who he had killed. In 1976 
there was an establishment of a new constitution that would declare Central African 
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Republic a parliamentary-monarch system but the legislature was never assembled and 
Jean Bedel Bokassa became the emperor a year later. In attempt to overthrow Bokassa, 
while he was away from the country, Operation Barrucuda took place; a plan to gain 
control over the capital Bangui by a group of paratroopers in 1979. This resulted in 
Dacko taking office. After a coup successfully took control over the government a new 
constitution referendum emerged that would grant the coup leader General Andre 
Kolinga a new single party called Rassemblement Democratique Centrafricain (RDC) 
and a six year term. His six year rule resulted with uprisings and demand for a multiparty 
system where the elections would be observed by the French. So in 1993 Ange-Felix 
Patasse of the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC), who also 
ran for president against David Dacko in 1997, was elected president. It was not until 
1997 that France decided that regional leaders and peacekeepers would have to intervene 
in order to stabilize the continuous rebellions that kept uprising in the capital.36 
Central African Republic’s instability has occurred also because of its 
fundamental roots dated back to its colonization by France. Upon the creation of the 
Central African state, concessionary companies relied on its resources but did not invest 
in Central African Republic’s institutions. They utilized its coffee, cocoa, cotton, ivory 
and rubber to profit elsewhere. Consequently, CAR hasn’t been able to create institutions 
that would regulate their resources so that the Central African’s may benefit from them; 
instead it has remained as a country filled with poverty, corruption, and unmanageable 
economy.   
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Regardless of CAR’s failure to profit from its land, external factors have found 
ways to benefit from its stagnancy. Ferguson, in Governing Extraction, states that badly 
governed African states still attract private investments, disputing what the World Bank 
and the IMF doctrines assume. Depending on what the country has to capitalize on would 
determine the capacity of the investment flows. Ferguson uses Angola and the extraction 
of oil to demonstrate the facilitation of investments in places with the least property rights 
and the choice to invest in oil instead of copper because of the extraction of cooper 
resulting more costly and dangerous. As for CAR, because of its unstable institutions and 
inability to enforce strict property rights the extractive economy on diamonds has been 
exploited by non-state actors. Unestablished property rights can create an unstable society 
causing displacements of populations, possibility for environmental degradation, and the 
attraction of corruption. Although unsecure property rights can harm local communities, 
they can also profit from the extractive economy that is supported by the insecurity 
through capitalizing on illicit markets. But it is non-state actors that can mostly benefit 
from an extractive economy. Ferguson explains that a country’s insecurity can actually 
benefit investors: 
Rather, it is the ability to provide contractual legal authority that can legitimate 
the extractive work of transnational firms. Neither political instability nor even 
civil war threatens such sovereignty (as long as the government sustains 
international recognition-normally the more or less automatic reward for holding 
the capital city). Nor need they threaten the actual work of extraction (at least of 
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concentrated, high-value minerals, thanks to the private-patchwork model of 
security that in increasingly dominant.37 
To reiterate, he states that as long as the government can prove legitimacy of being a 
nation-state in the international community, there can be an establishment of business. In 
fact, because of the module used in the international market for private investments, it is 
beneficial to have decentralized governments where businesses can be established 
without the legal intricacies of regulations.   
By having institutions with extractive nature allows for the government’s to 
become involved in private market arrangements that benefit from insecure property 
rights. These types of institutions lack a concrete system that can make governments 
accountable for their spending, willing to be transparent when it comes to policy-making, 
and by imposing limitations on government’s participating in desirable markets without 
checks and balances. The economic growth produced through extractive economies 
doesn’t trickle down to the people and therefore can cause uprisings due to its condensed 
wealth that doesn’t alleviate the country’s poverty.  
Networks built from extractive relations are cultivated through private markets. A 
patron-clientalism relationship is built between politicians and bureaucrats whom jointly 
enjoy the profitability of these connections. CAR’s extractive nature distinguishes the 
disparity between the elite’s relationships with regional counterparts from the Ivorian 
elites that keep the political power within the ethnic groups they identify themselves with. 
These differences are worth noting because it may indicate how these relationships 
dictate whether the wealth of a country circulates within its citizens or ends up boosting 
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other economies. CAR’s extractive economy is reliant on foreign money and external 
conditionality, very much like when they were colonized by France. For instance, during 
the time CAR was known as Oubangui-Chari, private companies claimed land in CAR 
from France notwithstanding the fact that France had just recently conquered CAR and 
wasn’t yet administered as a possession. France’s decision to use the land of CAR for 
concessions seemed like the best way to profit from it. So its concessionary nature 
determined the fate of CAR to which their interest did not involve building roads, 
schools, bridges, and hospitals and for that reason many well-structured institutions do 
not exist in Central African Republic. 
 A well-structured government should be able to help a country prosper by using 
its political power to provide the necessary systems to exploit the nation’s resources for 
the better of the people. When a government is unable to administer a market the 
possibility for insurgencies arises. Insurgencies create a system that does not consist of 
bureaucratic institutions, which is what we believe is needed to be a player in the 
international market. They create their own rules to play the same game legitimate 
players participate in, stable countries with functioning institutions, which is made 
possible because of sovereignty. When it comes to sovereignty a nation state has to be 
recognized sovereign to reap the benefits of having that status. The ability to take part in 
the market by shifting who has monopoly over the resources demonstrates that not only 
are the states deemed weak (incapable to control the power dynamics) but that there are 
informal avenues that can be used to exploit the market. This allows both leaders and 
insurgencies to be possible reapers of profit, consequently, and to partake in corrupted 
actions. An opportunity to partake in this kind of open market without any accountability 
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can allow for these reapers to be more prone to expand their power and pocket the profit, 
while not providing for the development or the livelihood of the nation. If we can better 
understand the informal markets used by these known to be “weak states”, we can 
provide an efficient module of development assistance that can support the nation’s 
market functions instead of assisting with institutions that are nonexistent or 
unproductive. 
CAR’s diamond economy has been exploited through extractive avenues and has 
been the source of the illicit markets that have emerged the ignition of conflicts. Timber 
is also a valuable natural resource that can be used for building and construction materials 
but within the diamond market the opportunity for profit is scattered among the 
population. The incompetence to have monopoly over force in this sector makes it less 
manageable for the government thus there is a need for better policies to administrate the 
exportation of diamonds. Diamonds is the natural resource that allows the population of 
CAR to have a chance at wealth, if they’re lucky. The low skill labor of artisanal mining, 
where no machinery is needed, makes the excavation technique cost effective. It is the 
most prominent technique used due to the opportunity of hiring workers in different sites. 
It is a good investment with low economical risk for the investors because there is not 
much investment needed since its labor doesn’t consist of machines and the most you 
need is people willing to work, in impoverish countries people are more than happy to be 
employed even if it’s for a low pay. But for those who work in artisanal mining, there is a 
health risk from the digging soil, sluicing, water siltation, erosion and soil degradation, 
along with the amalgamation process that is done to recover the metals from ore and 
combining them with mercury. Mercury in itself is a toxic metal that can lead to an attack 
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on the central nervous system and may cause disability, including brain damage and 
death. Furthermore respiratory diseases can be acquired through crushing ore. All these 
risks can be seen as worth taking when they’re isn’t many other choices and the 
possibility of finding a diamond can socially and economically help you prosper.38       
There have been regulatory failures in the mining sector where the sector has 
become dependent on the investors. Through the promoted expansion of the legal 
diamond trade the Kimberly Process Certification has emerged and has helped in 
regulating the diamond mining industry. Still significant amounts of diamonds have been 
transmitted through illicit markets managed by rebels and non-state actors.  Hereafter not 
regulating the redistribution of mining concessions and profits, failure to administer and 
fund accountability mechanisms to prevent graft, corruption, smuggling and 
embezzlement, failure of deep bargaining inequities among industry actors or to remedy 
deplorable working conditions in mining continues to make diamond mining a lucrative 
line of work. The diamond revenues continue to fund the patronage system that funnels 
profits to groups of elites because of its lack of oversight and accountability. For Central 
African Republic the north-eastern location of the diamond fields play a geopolitical role 
as they stem away from the centralized state power located in Bangui. 
The role of intervention has played a critical part in the instability of Central 
African Republic. Before a country is thought to need intervention, there is a collective 
agreement in identifying the country as unable to control its politics and economy. The 
country has to be understood to be a “failed” state. Rotberg states the following on failed 
states, 
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Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no 
longer deliver positive political goods to other inhabitants. Their governments 
lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes 
illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens.39 
As previously noted, when a government collapses the citizens, in turn, rely on other 
means to provide security and a living for themselves. Human ability to turn to intuition 
to fend is admirable because we hold the ability to find ways to support our livelihood, 
even if the state can no longer protect us. Whether it means finding ways to make money 
or taking up arms, when the leaders are no longer the people’s representatives, we can 
either unite as civilians or turn against each other. Other leaders may arise under these 
circumstances and can exploit the situation and the other citizens dealing with it as well. 
This abuse fumes chaos that can begin to denote a state as a “failed state”. Due to the 
interconnectedness of today’s world this type of violence can threaten the security of 
surrounding countries and non-state parties that may be indirectly involved. To avoid the 
progression of violence that may lead to a regional collapse, intervention has been 
supported and so forth aims to reconfigure the dynamics of the failed state as a response 
to the moral obligation of the international community. 
Responsibility to Protect is the international law that was developed after many 
atrocities occurred and went unpunished. Responsibility to protect consists of a) 
individual states commitment to protect its population b) assisting under stress before 
conflict raises c) member states under charter V11. This law pursues a constructive 
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approach in action that prioritizes non-combative, preventive approach first.40 By 
executing a plan through member expertise and resources, the international community 
multilaterally promotes efficiency and coherence. This law allows for the international 
community to interfere in conflicts and hold the perpetrators accountable. As previously 
witnessed in the Rwanda genocide, the recognition of an act determined to be genocide or 
any other atrocity would imply a response by the international community that may not 
be of interest to them. The negligence of not intervening to cease the genocide henceforth 
has served as an exemplar of why prevention of similar situations is needed.  
The international community’s desire to stabilize Central African Republic 
involves the benefit that the international community can exploit the natural resources to 
contribute to the international market. No one can benefit from a stagnant economy 
therefore it is in the interests of all parties to build economies through institutions that 
work for the people, who are the producers.41 As for CAR, with chaos and instability the 
absences of fundamentals needed to build economies that can profit the international 
market are nonexistent.  
CAR has received a large amount of deployments of peace keepers and peace 
agreements. In 2014 the UN commission reported that everyone involved in the conflict 
that consisted of war crimes and crimes against humanity and also the ethnic cleansing 
against the CAR’s Muslim community by the anti-balaka groups. These crimes affected 
207,700 nationals who fled the country and also 369, 000 that were internally displaced. 
Among the various resolutions there is the UN Security Council Resolution 2134 that 
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was implemented to prosecute CAR for violating the arms embargo, acts that violate 
international human rights law or international humanitarian law, using children soldiers, 
supporting armed criminal groups through the illicit exploitation of natural resources, 
obstructing humanitarian aid, and attacking UN missions or international troops.42 A UN 
peacekeeping operation called MINUSCA to replace and continue the efforts of MISCA 
that was led by the African Union The Security Council Resolution 2217 created in 2015 
authorizes MINUSCA through 2016 to protect civilians by supporting the political 
transition, extension of the state authority, facilitate humanitarian aid delivery, and serve 
as back up support in urgent temporary measures.  
MINUSCA peacekeepers have been accused of sexual abuse. French, African 
Union, and U.N. troops have been suspects of sexual abuse and the exploitation of boys 
as young as nine. Some peacekeepers from Chad, Sudan, and Cameroon have been said 
to be involved in Seleka abuses. Abuses committed by the presence of international 
community whether it be regional partners or foreigners suited as peacekeepers 
undermines the possibility of CAR to be looked at as more than a victim of predation or a 
source of corruption. Places like Central African Republic would benefit from 
collaborative efforts with local authorities and governmental institutions to create 
partnerships and strengthen political order but CAR’s lack of concrete and reliant 
institutions decapitates its possibility for stability.43 
The World Bank policies for Central African Republic 
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 The Economic Management and Governance Reform Grant of 2009 was rated 
satisfactory in outcome, bank performance and borrower performance but rated 
substantial for risk to development outcome. It was created to support the implementation 
of CAR’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper through strengthening public finance 
management and improving public sector and economic governance. The project was 
aimed to target the poverty that was affected in outskirts of the capital because it held the 
highest poverty rates. The country’s political stability and economic growth remained 
modest after the security situation and received assistance from the Bank and the IMF 
through a Reengagement and Institution-Building Support Program (RIBSUP) and a 
three year arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 
RIBSUP’s facilitated clearance of CAR’s debt to the Bank. A focus in the forestry and oil 
sector allowed the ability to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework so that a 
strong basis for economic growth and poverty reduction can receive increased foreign 
direct investment, export earnings, fiscal revenue, and a supply of petroleum products to 
industries and the population at competitive market prices. 
 The public financial management sector was affected by the political instability 
and the continuous conflicts that lingered in Central African Republic. Through the 
RIBSUP the government was assisted in creating a modern legal framework that would 
budget and minimize alternative procedures. The Country Financial Accountability 
Assessment (CFAA), the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA), and 
the audit of the Treasury displayed shortcomings in the PFM sector thus were considered 
reform priorities. Being that CAR institutions weren’t stable, the focus became to find 
ways to adjust their policies in order to move forward to recommending appropriate 
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policies. CAR’s debt within public utilities such as electricity, water supply, and 
telecommunication was delaying the ability for businesses and populations to properly 
function. Not having access to electricity, water supply, and telecommunication can 
hamper the productivity have a country because it can delays the services the businesses 
provide, day to day activities of the population, and the possibility of investments for the 
country. This lack of infrastructure can depict CAR’s inability to acquire policies that 
would benefit the economy and reduce poverty. The Economic Management and 
Governance Reform Grant was able to assist in creating a preparation and budget action 
plan that would address the chronic government debt and ensure the payment of those 
essential utilities are paid on time. 
 The EMGRG has contributed to a modest result in alleviating poverty and 
improving social outcomes by assisting the government in creating budget allocations in 
priority sectors. There has been an increase of 38 percent in the total expenditures in the 
2008 budget and an increase in the allocation of resources to health and education has 
been observed. The report includes the possibility of a new government as a result of the 
2010 elections that may not continue the proposed PFM system. With the possibility of a 
new government changing the current dynamics of the recommended policies would be 
such a policy ineffective. Better analysis of CAR’s unstable political system would need 
to be considered in order to prevent or workaround a government’s ability to shuffle 
around policies they may feel are not a priority or inadequate to their political system. 
Recommended policies should be based off of politician’s goals and concerns for their 
country. This program focuses on the expansion of oil and forestry but doesn’t regard the 
profit that CAR can obtain from the diamond sector. The report claims that the 
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government administration for natural resource management remains weak. I am curious 
to understand why oil, forestry I understand can have many uses on everyday materials, 
was a focus instead of diamond in this program. CAR still has a security risk that 
impedes the government from mobilizing the resources that would accelerate the DDR 
program for the peace process. Therefore the lack of attention to providing policies to 
manage the natural resource, diamond, may continue to keep CAR at risk of instability. It 
does not suffice promoting good governance and the rule of law and rebuilding and 
diversifying the economy, as this program aimed to do, without considering the violence 
that may be still occurring.44 
 The Emergency Project Paper for the Emergency Urban Infrastructure 
Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project in 2010 was intended to assist in rapidly 
rehabilitating, restoring, improving and expanding sustainable access to basic 
infrastructure services to the population of the most deprived in Bangui. Since I noted in 
my previous analysis of the 2009 project that the highest level of poverty in CAR was 
outside the capital Bangui, it is relevant to highlight this project’s aim, a year later, to 
assist the ‘most deprived districts’ in Bangui. Actually, this project would support the 
previous emphasized argument that the World Bank aims to target problems they can 
solve. This project aimed to provide urban services; water supply and energy services 
along with sewerage networks, waste collection. The project was a response to the 
recurrent floods that were taking place in CAR and destroyed homes and damaged 
infrastructures in Bangui. Natural disasters can damage any country but a country’s 
inability to provide safety nets to recuperate from those disasters demonstrates that the 
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country still lacks fundamental structures.  The operation was to implement works to 
improve services and reduce flooding in slums of Bangui, generate employment for 
unskilled labor for the poorest population, and improve the governance of water and 
urban infrastructure sectors to improve budget execution. Development objective of the 
project was indicated to make satisfactory progress. Ten boreholes were drilled; water 
towers and kiosks were being awaited to provide access to the water supply. Immediate 
results can be seen from this project. Under the circumstances that this project emerged 
says something about the kind of policies recommended by the World Bank that can be 
most effective. The project aimed to respond to an external shock to the country.45 The 
recommendations for the country did not consist of heavy political entanglements or 
unresolvable violence; it was merely a response to a dire situation. Perhaps recalling the 
World Bank’s functions upon creation would help us understand that their policies are 
most effective when it comes to immediate autonomous responses to catastrophes.  
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Conclusion 
Post-conflict countries struggle to rebuild economies after their tumultuous 
events. Conflict usually emerge and continue because of the intricacies of the local 
politics. Usually these conflicts are reported to be receded but the continual uprisings 
delay the country from moving past conflict and into well-functioning. Post-conflict 
countries were not in the best condition prior to the conflict and face even more 
difficulties in targeting poverty and economic growth. Hence the post-conflict narrative 
many times conceptualizes countries to be the same even if their civil war may have 
different politics, history, and dynamics involved. When it comes to development 
assistance, post-conflict countries with a history with stable institutions seem to best 
acquire policy recommendations. From my research I have gathered that one of the things 
that would make the World Bank more inclined to produce effective policies is if the 
recipient country has stable institutions and systems that allows for the country’s 
potential extractive resources and promising political landscape to be exploited.  The 
World Bank’s way of functioning transmits through the type of policies that they 
recommend. Their overview of a country would facilitate macroeconomic policies that 
would work best if there are current institutions in place to execute those policies. The 
focus to target the economy as a whole by looking at the performance, decision making, 
and structure instead of critically analyzing the individual markets of a country 
demonstrates the Bank’s inadequacy to provide assistance to countries dealing with 
complicated dynamics. For this reason I argue that World Bank programs are meant to 
assist countries who they can maximize profit from in the long run. By looking into the 
programs recommended to both Cote d’Ivoire and Central African Republic I was able to 
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get a better analysis on which sectors they targeted post conflict and what kind of systems 
they established, if applicable.  
What I been able to draw from the programs suggested for Cote d’Ivoire is that 
the policies had an underlined reliance on institutions that were established prior to the 
conflict. For example the first report focused on rural policies to would facilitate the 
technologies used by farmers. Although the pilot of the program was affected by the 
emergence of the civil war, the institutional impact was recorded to be modest. The 
enhancement of the agricultural sector by technologies demonstrates the country’s ability 
to continue to expand on agricultural production in order to increase their comparative 
advantage. The second project involved an economic recovery grant in which resulted 
with a satisfactory rating. The grant’s ability to reinstate relations between Cote d’Ivoire 
and the World Bank resumed the Bank’s carefully constructed recommendations. This 
project, although rated satisfactory, demonstrates a huge impact on Cote d’Ivoire’s 
economy as poverty was reduced through the pro-poor spending budget and demonstrates 
how having good standing with the World Bank may benefit the countries.  
After reading through the different programs that were recommended to CAR I 
realized the World Bank’s ability to provide immediate isolated assistance. The World 
Bank effectively provided the support needed due the flood that caused more distress  in 
CAR and ended up damaging there not so solid institutions. What made the World 
Bank’s response to the crisis effective was the elaborate response and assistance they 
provided. This indicates that my hypothesis of the African countries doing better when a 
critical analysis of the current situation and an opportunity to benefit from the stability of 
the country is partially true. Central African Republic may hold an extractive economy of 
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timber, which I have emphasized in through analyzing one of the World Bank’s reports, 
but their instable institutions don’t make them an investable country thus it receives 
policies that may attempt to trigger economic movement but not necessarily improve it. 
Central African Republic’s politics remain to be much more complicated than the politics 
in Cote d’Ivoire.  Cote d’Ivoire’s political stability has allowed for the restructuring of 
their current institutions, as per World Bank recommendations, to better generate income 
into the economy by attracting investors.  For Cote d’Ivoire, their Cinderella fairy tale has 
been fulfilled with its granted wishes; not to be looked as an incompetent country in the 
eyes of the international community but more of a partner invested in the international 
market. 
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